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R. v. Lorraine Harris, Raymond Rock, Alan Cherry and Michael Faulder [2005] EWCA Crim 1980

[This edited version of the report has been prepared by Dr Robert N Moles Underlining where it occurs is for editorial emphasis]

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This is the discussion of the general issues in these cases
This is the Harris case
This is the Fauldner case
This is the Rock case

21 July 2005 - Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)

External link to full text of R. v. Harris, Rock, Cherry and Faulder

Lord Justice Gage :

The Cherry case

Cherry faced an indictment charging him with the manslaughter of his partner's daughter Sarah. Sarah's mother, Mrs Shirley Eburne-Day, and her children including Sarah and Cherry, at the time of the incident giving rise to the charge, were all living together at Mrs Eburne-Day's home. Sarah was the youngest of Mrs Eburne-Day's three children. Mrs Eburne-Day and Cherry had lived together for some months. The evidence suggested that he was a good step-father to the children. On Thursday, 3 February 1994, in the morning, Sarah was left in the sole care of Cherry. Earlier in the week she had developed a thumb infection for which a doctor had prescribed antibiotics. After taking some medicine on 2 February Sarah was sick so different antibiotics were prescribed. On the morning of 3 February 1994, at about 8.30am, Mrs Eburne-Day left Sarah at home with Cherry whilst she drove her two older children and a neighbour's daughter to school. The plan was that Cherry would take Sarah to Mrs Eburne-Day's father's home where, in the course of the morning, Cherry and Mrs Eburne-Day would meet before both went to Birmingham for Cherry to attend a job interview.

That morning Sarah was a little better than on the previous day and appeared to be behaving perfectly ordinarily. Mrs Eburne-Day said that she had no concerns about leaving her. She said that she and Cherry had discussed Sarah's health and decided that she was fit enough to be left with her grandparents. In evidence, Cherry said that he disagreed. He said that Sarah was not very well on Thursday morning. She was not in a bright condition and wanted to sleep and be cuddled by her mother. He denied that he had any conversation with Mrs Eburne-Day about Sarah's health that morning. Lianne Osbourne, a next door neighbour, called that morning for a lift to school. Before leaving with Mrs Eburne-Day she said that she saw Cherry briefly. He was wearing dark trousers, a white striped shirt and a red brown paisley patterned tie. Apart from his jacket he appeared almost ready to go out. In evidence Cherry denied that when seen by Lianne Osbourne he had been fully dressed for work. There was evidence that Cherry was next seen in the street in a distressed state seeking assistance from various neighbours. Sarah's grandfather, Mr Eburne-Day, received a telephone call from Cherry at precisely 8.55am asking him to call an ambulance, which he did. Mrs Redding, a neighbour and trained nurse, saw Sarah just before the ambulance arrived. She said that Sarah appeared to be dead or on the verge of death. She applied resuscitation techniques until the ambulance arrived at approximately 9.20am. Sarah was taken first to George Eliot Hospital in Nuneaton but was later transferred to the Intensive Therapy Unit at Birmingham Children's Hospital. In spite of all medical efforts Sarah died about 48 hours later.

On 4 February 1994 Cherry was arrested on suspicion of causing grievous bodily harm with intent. This was before Sarah had been pronounced dead. He was interviewed by police and explained that he had left Sarah standing on a small yellow chair whilst he went upstairs briefly to put on a shirt and tie. Apparently, it had been Sarah's habit to stand on the yellow chair in order to look out of the window at the front of the house. He explained that when he returned he found Sarah lying on the floor motionless and making gurgling noises. He said that he picked her up and described her body feeling like a rag doll. She did not respond and therefore he telephoned her grandfather to ask him to telephone for an ambulance. He explained that she must have become suddenly ill and fallen from the chair. He denied shaking her or throwing her around but said that she had fallen out of her sister's bed at the weekend. On 6 February 1994 he was charged with the murder of Sarah and after caution replied "I'm not guilty. I've committed no offence". In the event, the Crown proceeded with a charge of manslaughter rather than murder.

At trial, giving evidence in his own defence, Cherry repeated what he had said at interview. He said that after going upstairs to finish off dressing for "only a few minutes" he returned to find Sarah "lying on the floor, obviously badly injured." He said that when he picked Sarah up and tried to pat her back he removed "some yellow stuff from her mouth". At trial the prosecution called a number of medical witnesses. Doctor (now Professor) Whitwell conducted the post mortem upon Sarah. Her finding was that death had been caused by "cerebral swelling and subdural haematoma". In addition, she found two bruises at the back of the head (3.5cms and 1.5cms in diameter and on opposite sides) and five small areas of bruising higher up. In her opinion the five smaller bruises were consistent with pressure from fingers. In cross-examination she did not accept that the injuries could have been caused by falling from the yellow chair. She said that the injuries were more consistent with Sarah's head being forcibly put against something. In her opinion it was highly unlikely that Sarah could have injured herself by banging her head against the floor although that was not impossible. She said it was unlikely the injuries could have been caused by a single fall because there were two separate areas of impact and two separate bruises, although she could not exclude this absolutely.

A radiologist, Dr Chapman, stated that it was very rare for a child to have this kind of bleeding from a domestic fall. In his opinion a fall from the yellow chair had not caused Sarah's injuries. Dr Akuba, a neurological registrar, in a witness statement, said that she had inserted a tube into Sarah's skull as part of her treatment and recorded that "Cerebral spinal fluid emerged under moderate pressure. It was yellow and looked like old blood. Query, query". Dr Rylance, a consultant paediatrician, having seen Sarah at Birmingham Children's Hospital, took the view that her injuries were non-accidental. He was asked about a previous statement which he had made and in which he stated that the injury giving rise to blood inside the skull occurred almost certainly more than 12 hours previously and probably more than 36 hours previously. He said in evidence that he had since changed his opinion and in fact it could have been 10½ or 11 hours previously. He said that Sarah's vomiting the day before was more likely to have been caused by the medicine than a previous brain injury because when she stopped taking the medicine she stopped vomiting.

Finally, the prosecution called Mr Flint, a surgeon, who described the five small bruises on Sarah's head which were, in his opinion, indicative of her having been held. The two bruises on the back of her head suggested at least two blows. In his opinion it was very unlikely that the bruises were caused by her slipping backwards from the chair and hitting her head on the floor. In his opinion a healthy child could not sustain such injuries revealed by the post mortem by falling the short distance from the chair onto the carpeted floor. In addition to his own evidence, there was called on Cherry's behalf a neurologist Dr West and a consultant pathologist, Dr Ackland. Dr West had viewed films taken by Dr Whitwell. He said that what he saw was consistent with a child having aspirated liquid which was a frequent complication of head injuries. Dr Ackland did not rule out the possibility of abuse causing the injuries but was of the opinion that an accidental fall from the chair was a significant possibility. In his opinion there was a small possibility that Sarah had some earlier injury that was aggravated by the fall but he did not regard that as a high possibility. He said that the five marks on Sarah's head may have been caused by a firm grip during the medical treatment. In his summing-up the judge described the issue for the jury to decide in the following terms: "The cause of her death was a swelling of the brain caused by an impact of one sort or another. It is the prosecution case that the impact was in consequence of an unlawful blow delivered by this defendant. Your task will be to decide whether that case is proved or not." After deliberating for just over two and a half hours the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty of manslaughter.

Cherry

We again do not repeat the facts of this matter, which have already been set out. It will be recollected that on Cherry's account, he left the child alone for a matter of minutes downstairs while he went upstairs; when he returned minutes later, she was, as the Judge put it in the summing-up, in a "poor state" on the floor. Essentially the decision for the jury was whether they could be sure that Sarah's death was caused by an unlawful act on the part of Cherry (a formulation to which we shall return, later) or whether her death was or might have been attributable to an accidental fall from a chair some 6-8 inches high ("the chair"). On this appeal, Mr Mansfield QC's submissions proceeded as follows:
i) The Crown's position had shifted between trial and appeal; at trial, this was a case of impact; now it was a case of both shaking and impact; but that was not how the matter had been placed before the jury.
ii) There was new evidence to the effect that death or serious injury from low level falls could not be ruled out. In addition, there was a possibility that Sarah had aspirated vomit. Death could have resulted from a combination of the two. In any event, if this was a case of both shaking and impact, the innocent combination of an accidental fall followed by a resuscitative shake could not be ruled out.
iii) Great care had to be taken in approaching the bruising on Sarah's head and body, both in the light of the new evidence and the course which the trial had taken.
iv) In all the circumstances, the conviction was unsafe.

The Crown resists the appeal and contends that nothing has emerged to undermine the safety of the conviction. In a nutshell, the evidence as to low-level falls is inapplicable to a fall of the nature postulated here. Upon analysis, there was no evidence capable of suggesting that aspiration of vomit was a relevant consideration. As to the new evidence, it had all to be taken into account; Cherry could not pick and choose; the introduction of a shaking component did nothing to undermine the safety of the conviction. Evidence of Sarah's other injuries, properly and fairly considered, lent support to the Crown's case and suggested that the notion of an accidental fall was fanciful.

The new evidence on the appeal

We begin with the pathologists. As already observed, Professor Whitwell conducted the post-mortem and was a prosecution witness at the trial; on the appeal, she now gave evidence for Cherry. In her witness statement for the trial, Professor Whitwell attributed Sarah's injuries and brain damage, taken in conjunction with the scalp bruising (already described), to "direct blunt trauma". She went on to say this: "The degree of trauma necessary to produce such damage is considerable and the findings are not consistent with a simple fall onto a carpeted surface. They are consistent with the head being forcibly propelled against a hard surface or a blunt object contacting the head. Apart from the brain injuries there are a number of bruises on the body. The sighting of a number of these is highly suggestive of non-accidental injury rather than being caused accidentally – in particular the bruises to the buttock, face, thigh and arm. "

Her report of 2 June 2005, prepared for the appeal, evidences her revised views. She said that the possibility of Sarah suffering a fatal injury as a result of falling from the chair had to be considered afresh in the light of Dr Plunkett's research. The "primary brain pathology" was due to lack of oxygen; this hypoxic-ischaemic injury could have been caused as a result of primary injury to the brain, causing Sarah to stop breathing and/or as a result of "vomiting with inhalation of vomit into the lungs". She would "still to some extent be unhappy as regards the scalp bruises arising in a fall but it has to be a considered possibility that Sarah's head impacted against some other surface as well as the ground". In her oral evidence at the appeal, she explained that her change of view was based on Dr Plunkett's work and her own experience. She had not found diffuse axonal injury; such trauma as she found was associated with impact. The need to explain Sarah's scalp bruising (in two separate locations) led to Professor Whitwell contemplating that Sarah might have struck her head both on the window and then on the ground in the course of her fall; indeed, she later underlined that two impacts were needed to explain this bruising.

Professor Whitwell agreed that at post-mortem, there was no evidence of vomit or aspiration. She agreed that Sarah had up to a maximum of 22 bruises; she was "concerned" about that number of bruises. They were probably "more than" fair wear and tear for a 21 month old. In the absence of proper explanation, they were highly suggestive of abuse. There had been no developments in science between the trial and the appeal to alter her view as to the relevance of the two sites of scalp bruising. Her view at the trial (and she was the person who had conducted the post-mortem) was that those two areas of bruising had been caused at about the same time. She had herself identified traumatic injury to the brain. She accepted that the subdural bleeding occurred because of the tearing of bridging veins. Dr Rorke-Adams was firmly of the view that Sarah's injuries were inconsistent with a fall from the chair; she placed emphasis on the multiple areas of injury and the extent of those injuries. Sarah's injuries were caused by "trauma"; the "pattern of injury" was characteristic of both shaking and impact; it was a combination of both. Although the degree of injury could not be correlated with the degree of force, considering the injuries as a whole, they must have been caused by "strong force".

Pausing here, it will be apparent that there was agreement between Professor Whitwell and Dr Rorke-Adams: (i) that there had been traumatic injury to the brain; (ii) that there were subdural haemorrhages; (iii) that those haemorrhages had been caused by the tearing of bridging veins. There was some dispute between these two witnesses as to whether further injury to the brain, which it is unnecessary to detail, was also attributable to trauma or was artefactual in origin. Impressed as we were by Dr Rorke-Adams' evidence in this regard (the coincidence relied upon by Professor Whitwell seemed unlikely), this is another of those areas where we do not think it would be right simply to discount a reputable expert's contrary views. We therefore proceed with this appeal on the assumption (in favour of Cherry) that the brain damage suffered by Sarah did not extend beyond the areas of agreement between Professor Whitwell and Dr Rorke-Adams, summarised above.

We move next to the evidence of Dr Plunkett, which it is helpful to consider here in a little greater detail than in the preceding appeal of Rock. Dr Plunkett said that there was nothing inevitable about a serious injury resulting from a fall from the chair but "the potential for serious injury or even death exists". The floor surface did not matter; it was immaterial whether it was carpet over concrete or just concrete. Questioned as to his research, Dr Plunkett explained that he had worked from a database for head and neck injuries involving playground equipment, recorded by the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC"). Over 11 ½ years, he had identified 18 fatalities from head and neck injuries involving falls. None of the children (or infants) in his study had formal retinal examinations. These cases included falls from swings, which, he agreed were complex or complicated falls. He further agreed that none of these cases were similar to a shaken baby case. The distance of a fall is said to be measured with reference to the closest part of the body to the ground at the beginning of a fall.

Case no. 5 in Dr Plunkett's study was said to be closest to a fall from a 6-8 inch chair; this was suggested on the basis that the child in question had suffered the equivalent of a 12 inch fall. Dr Plunkett's paper described this fall as follows: " A 23 month-old was playing on a plastic gym set in the garage at her home…She had climbed the attached ladder to the top rail above the platform and was straddling the rail, with her feet 0.70 metres (28 inches) above the floor. She lost her balance and fell headfirst onto a 1-cm (3/8 inch) thick piece of plush carpet remnant covering the concrete floor. She struck the carpet first with her outstretched hands, then with the right front side of her forehead, followed by her right shoulder. Her grandmother had been watching …. And videotaped the fall. She cried after the fall but was alert and talking…However, approximately 5 minutes later she vomited and became stuporous…. A CT scan indicated a large right-sided subdural haematoma…. The haematoma was immediately evacuated. She remained comatose postoperatively, developed cerebral oedema with herniation, and was removed from life support 36 hours after the fall….."

Dr Plunkett suggested that, as her head had been some 42 inches above the ground when the fall began and as her body length was some 30 inches, it was equivalent to her falling from a chair 12 inches high. We confess some difficulty with this reasoning but we nonetheless continue with our consideration of Dr Plunkett's evidence. We do acknowledge that we felt, as indeed Dr Anslow later expressed it, "shocked" that a fall, as captured on the video (which was shown to the Court), could have resulted in a fatality; this, indeed, may be the strength of Dr Plunkett's evidence, so far as it goes. Nonetheless, it is pertinent to record the following: (i) It transpired, as explained by Dr Plunkett in his oral evidence following the playing of the video, that the rail from which the child fell was in fact 39 inches above the floor, not 28 inches; (ii) she fell a sufficient distance for her to rotate and so as to fall onto her head with some 2/3 of her body weight contributing to the impact; (iii) there was a lucid interval after the fall (unlike the cases before us); (iv) the haematoma was large and lop-sided (again unlike the thin film haematomas encountered in cases such as the present); Dr Plunkett agreed that the mass effect of this haematoma caused the child's death. Notwithstanding all these factors, Dr Plunkett continued to maintain that the Case 5 fall was "exactly comparable" to a 12 inch fall. The velocity was relevant and what was not known was the "minimal impact velocity" required to cause these types of injuries.

Closely cross-examined, Dr Plunkett agreed this:
"Q. …your paper does not establish the proposition that any impact, no matter how minor, can lead to fatal consequences, does it?
A. That is correct."

After some questioning from the Court, Dr Plunkett acknowledged the common sense proposition that the lesser the distance of the fall, the less likely it was to cause an injury to a vulnerable part of the body. In any event though for a time it seemed that Dr Plunkett was resistant to the suggestion, the distance of a fall is a necessarily relevant consideration. Dr Plunkett's own formula for impact velocity was as follows: Velocity (V) squared = 2 x Acceleration (A) x Distance (D). From this it must follow that, all other things being equal, a reduction in D will result in a reduced V. Reverting to the individual case of Cherry, Dr Plunkett asserted that the bruising on Sarah's body amounted to "normal wear and tear". We observe at once that this answer was manifestly unconvincing. Standing back from Dr Plunkett's evidence, we do not say that his work does not have utility. As recorded, we were ourselves very surprised by the outcome in case no. 5, as shown on the video. However, we think that it is important to look closely at both the limits of his study and its relevance to any individual case; the true comparability of the falls he studied to the cases before the Court merits careful scrutiny. We return to this theme when indicating our conclusions on the Cherry appeal. Mr Richards gave evidence for the Crown in this case as well. In his opinion, Sarah died as a result of a severe inflicted non-accidental head injury. His oral evidence included the following passage:
"Q. You have used the word 'severe'. Degree of force required in this particular case?
A. Far in excess of anything we see in normal life with children of this age. Children are toddling around at this age. They fall over all the time. It they suffered severe head injury from little falls, the casualty departments would be inundated with them, the intensive cares would be full of them, my operating theatres would be operating or dealing with them on a daily basis. I have not seen a child of this age suffer a severe head injury in my 24-year neurosurgical career from a minor injury as described or….as considered. This very short 6-inch fall." Other than being prepared to accept never to say never, try as Mr Mansfield QC might, Mr Richards did not shift in substance from this answer.

We turn next to the issue of aspiration of vomit. Given that, for very good reason to which we shall come, it played an ever diminishing role on the appeal, we shall take it very shortly indeed. Mr Wrightson, a neurosurgeon, whose evidence on behalf of Cherry we heard by way of video-link from New Zealand, said this, in his report for the appeal: "…there is no doubt that Sarah vomited and aspirated material into her lungs. The vomiting was described by Mr. Cherry and was confirmed by those who arrived to help. A chest X-ray later in the day of injury showed 'widespread airspace shadowing throughout both lungs'. The hypoxia which this would have caused is likely to have resulted in or at least contributed to the gross cerebral swelling that was present. " In his oral evidence, Mr Wrightson said, early on, that this was "the key to the whole situation". There was no reason for Cherry to have invented the evidence he gave. As to aspiration, the ambulance personnel described a "bubbly" chest. At the hospital, copious bloodstained fluid came out from the lungs; the chest x-ray and the findings on post-mortem were likewise said to support these conclusions. Under cross-examination, Mr Wrightson agreed that there was no sign of vomit at the scene; that the neighbours who attended (one of whom was a nurse) did not suggest that Sarah had vomited; that one of the paramedics had said that he did not see any signs of vomiting; that, at the post-mortem, no sign of aspiration pneumonia was found.

Dr Peters, a consultant paediatric intensivist, was called by the Crown. His impressively clear evidence may be summarised as follows:
i) Neurogenic pulmonary oedema ("NPO") was a condition involving fluid in the lungs as a result of something catastrophic happening to the brain. It is characteristically immediate. The description given by the para-medics was "almost a text-book" description of NPO: "A combination of the noisy chest, with obvious fluid, with pink frothy secretions coming out of the mouth and the child making respiratory effort to overcome this fluid in the chest are all typical. It could read like a text-book description."
ii) At no stage was there any evidence of aspirated vomit. The most relevant evidence was that of Sarah's appearance at intubation. Had aspiration been a major cause of respiratory failure then, typically, when the tube was placed into the lungs there would be a "welling up" from the chest of whatever was aspirated. No suggestion of aspirated vomit was made by the intensive care staff; to the contrary the fluid seen remained pink and frothy and became more blood-stained as time passed. This was a typical pattern of NPO. Had the fluid been erythromycin (a very common child's antibiotic which Sarah had been given), Dr Peters would have expected the paediatric staff to recognise the difference between it and blood-staining.
iii) To cause respiratory distress suddenly, massive aspiration was necessary. If so, however, it would have been apparent on intubation and subsequent care. Conversely, unless it was massive, it would not be a "credible cause" of this respiratory distress of this severity.

The ophthalmic evidence can be disposed of summarily. Dr Gregson, called by the Crown, fairly conceded that the retinal haemorrhages in this case were superficial only and were not typical of those discussed in the other appeals before the Court. They were not typical of shaking. In the circumstances, we do not think that the Crown case derives any support from the retinal haemorrhages. Conversely, however, we were not in any way persuaded that the absence of "typical" retinal haemorrhages somehow assisted Cherry's case on the appeal. For our part, this being a case where impact as well as shaking is alleged we regard the absence of "typical" retinal haemorrhages as neutral. We say no more of this point. In the event, it is unnecessary to consider the otherwise interesting (sub-) issue as to when the retinal haemorrhages in truth first appeared. Finally in this case we have considered detailed written reports from two experts in biomechanics: Dr Thibault and Dr Bertocci for Cherry and for the Crown respectively. Dr Thibault, whose approach to 'injury thresholds' we have described earlier, considered that the forces applied to the head in a 3 foot impact fall onto carpet represented approximately 50,000 radians per second squared, whereas the injury threshold associated with subdural haemorrhage and diffuse axonal haemorrhage were between 8,000 and 12,000 radians per second squared. A 3 foot fall therefore, in Dr Thibault's view, is well within the physical context in which subdural bleeding and DAI may occur. Dr Thibault identified the primary point of impact to be the occipital region. The cause of subdural bleeding is accepted to be rupture of bridging veins, but such a rupture could occur, in Dr Thibault's opinion, as a result of the substantial internal rotational forces that arise when a child falls and impacts her head. He concluded that whilst deliberate inflicted injury cannot be ruled out, the injuries were entirely consistent with the mechanics of the speculated accidental fall.

Dr Bertocci explained that her habitual starting point when asked to determine whether a given account fits the resulting injuries is to begin with an assessment of any bruising found on the child: 'bruising represents points of force application and a roadmap to the child's exposure' to force. Dr Thibault considered that the two apparently separate sites of impact could be explained by a fall inducing a well-distributed contact load across the occipital region resulting in dynamic in-bending of the skull and contusion to the outer left and right margins of the total contact area. The presence of bruising on two opposite sides of the head indicated to Dr Bertocci two very different lines of force applied from differing directions, and is not consistent with a fall from a chair. Further, Dr Bertocci observed that the size of the scalp bruises at 2.5cm and 3.5cm are much larger than bruises found in children injured through accidents. Finally, Dr Bertocci summarised published research and her own unit's experiments with an automotive "12 month old" crash test dummy. Her conclusion, which is again in total contrast to that of Dr Thibault, was that a 12 month old falling from a 9 inch vertical position impacting their head on a padded carpet surface would produce head accelerations that are well below published biomechanical injury thresholds. She concluded that Sarah's injuries are not attributable to a fall from a 9 inch chair.

Conclusions

As is apparent, encephalopathy and subdural haemorrhages are present in this case. With regard to the latter, there is no dispute here that they were caused by the tearing of bridging veins. Two elements of the "triad" are thus present. For reasons already set out, although there were retinal haemorrhages (the third element of the triad), these are neutral and do not advance the argument of either party on the appeal. Next it is convenient to mention the issue of aspiration of vomit, essentially to dispose of it. We found Dr Peters' analysis of the evidence on this issue compelling. Mr Wrightson's views to the contrary do not survive this analysis. We accept Dr Peters' evidence and dismiss aspiration of vomit as a credible cause or contributory cause of Sarah's death. We turn to the topic of low-level falls. We have already indicated our general views with regard to Dr Plunkett's evidence. Having given the matter anxious consideration, we are not persuaded that the postulated fall from the 6-8 inch chair was a credible cause or contributory cause of Sarah's death. Our reasons are these:
i) On any realistic view, the fall here (if fall there was or might have been) was of a very different type and nature from those forming the subject of Dr Plunkett's study. The factual differences between any fall here and Dr Plunkett's Case 5 (said to be the closest comparable) are marked indeed, not least with regard to the nature of the subdural bleeding found.
ii) Even if the reservations in i) above are put to one side, notwithstanding the extent of Dr Plunkett's research, there is no example of a 6-8 inch fall, from a static object, causing death or serious injury to a 21 month old child. As he himself agreed in cross-examination (see above), it does not follow from Dr. Plunkett's study that any impact, no matter how minor, can lead to fatal consequences.
iii) Even if (contrary to the above) it was thought that Dr Plunkett's study did mean that a fall from the chair here was capable of furnishing a realistically possible innocent explanation for Sarah's death, it remains necessary to address the two separate sites of scalp bruising. Professor Whitwell conducted the post-mortem; as she agreed in her oral evidence, her impression (at least at the time of the trial) was that the two separate areas of scalp bruising had been caused at about the same time. Inevitably and as Professor Whitwell further agreed, no scientific developments since the trial could alter the relevance of these two separate sites of bruising. Accordingly, for the fall to be capable of providing an innocent explanation of these injuries, it was necessary to postulate two impacts (window and floor) in the course of the same fall. As it seems to us, this is pure speculation and stretches credibility altogether too far.
iv) We have set out earlier Mr Richards' observations (i) that if such falls did generate severe injuries, casualty departments and the like would be inundated; but (ii) that in more than 20 years of practice he had never encountered a severe head injury in a child of this age arising from a 6 inch fall. Some caution is necessary in approaching these observations; first, there is no claim that serious injury is the inevitable result of falls of this nature; secondly, "never" is an unfortunate word. Nonetheless, when this evidence based on practical experience is considered cumulatively with reasons i) – iii) above, it furnishes powerful support for the conclusion that the notion of an accidental fall in this case, causing or contributing to Sarah's death, is simply fanciful.
v) We are not swayed from our view by the evidence of biomechanics summarised earlier. This is a complex, developing and (as yet) necessarily uncertain area of science, as illustrated by the stark divergence of opinion between Dr Bertocci and Dr Thibault. Be that as it may, Dr Thibault's views are altogether too difficult to reconcile with evidence of primary fact in this case, for the conviction to be regarded as unsafe by reason of the biomechanical evidence.

Pulling the threads together, this is a case of a sudden collapse of a 21 month old child. Cherry was alone at home with her. His factual account cannot explain her injuries and death. Upon analysis, the possible explanations advanced on his behalf on the appeal do not carry credibility. The case cannot be one of SIDS, given, as is undisputed, her traumatically caused subdural haemorrhaging. As it seems to us, in the light of those subdural haemorrhages and the separate sites of scalp bruising, the inference can properly be made that her injuries and death were attributable to a combination of shaking and impact. On any realistic view (and in this case we are of course only concerned with a count of manslaughter), the force involved must have been such that the risk of some harm to Sarah would have been foreseeable to all sober and reasonable people. In the circumstances, unless there is anything in the argument as to the shift in the Crown's case between trial and appeal rendering the conviction unsafe (see below), we are amply satisfied of the safety of Cherry's conviction for manslaughter.

We are fortified in this conclusion by the evidence as to up to 22 bruises on Sarah's body. As Professor Whitwell was driven to agree, these were highly suggestive of abuse, in the absence of proper explanation of which there was and has been none. In approaching this evidence, we have thought it right to proceed with caution; as the summing-up suggests, at the trial, Cherry was treated as a good stepfather and there had been no suggestion of any improper behaviour towards Sarah or any of the other children. But on the state of the evidence at the trial, there may have been no need for the Crown to explore this wider area. Cherry, having introduced new lines of inquiry on the appeal, cannot, we think, complain at all the evidence being revisited. While even then we would have hesitated long and hard before treating this question of bruising as determinative of the appeal, in this appeal we see no unfairness in taking it into account as an additional reason pointing towards the safety of the conviction. Finally, we turn to Mr Mansfield's submission that the conviction was unsafe because of the shift in the Crown's position between trial and appeal; at trial, this had been a case of impact; now it was one of both shaking and impact. Cherry did not have a fair opportunity to deal with the "new" case; nor did the jury consider it. With respect, we cannot agree.

First, as a matter of principle and as already foreshadowed in dealing with the evidence of bruising to Sarah's body, once an appellant has introduced new evidence on the appeal, he can hardly complain if such evidence is answered or rebutted by the Crown. Unavoidably, in such a process, the nature of the case may take on a different hue and there may be some change in the manner in which the Crown puts its case. But it cannot be, that on this ground alone, a conviction must be regarded as unsafe; fresh evidence, once admitted, may serve to confirm, not only to undermine, the safety of a conviction. Accordingly, if on all the evidence before this Court, the only reasonable conclusion is that, considered in the round, the conviction is safe, the Court should give effect to that conclusion: R v Hanratty (Dec'd) [2002] 2 Cr. App. R. 30.

Secondly, however, this principle is qualified by consideration of fact and degree. In an individual case where an issue of this kind arises, it may be that the Crown's change of position between trial and appeal is such that the conviction cannot be considered safe. Whether it does or not will necessarily depend on the facts of the particular case. Here, we see nothing in the development of the Crown's case on the appeal that renders Cherry's conviction unsafe. The essential question for the jury was whether Sarah's death was accidental or the result of some unlawful act on the part of Cherry. That was the fundamental divide; in this case, given the nature of Cherry's evidence, the mechanism was necessarily of secondary importance. It is true that the mechanism favoured by the Crown at trial was one of impact. It is further true that on appeal the Crown's case as to mechanism has evolved to one of a combination of shaking and impact. That evolution, however, cannot have caused Cherry any prejudice. Moreover, any suggestion here that a well-intentioned shake was capable of giving rise to a possible defence depended on the credibility of the explanations we have already dismissed, namely those relating to the low-level fall and/or the aspiration of vomit. In all the circumstances, we are fully satisfied as to the safety of the conviction. This appeal must be dismissed.

 

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