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Networked Knowledge - Law ReportR. v. Lorraine Harris, Raymond Rock, Alan Cherry and Michael Faulder [2005] EWCA Crim 1980[This edited version of the report has been prepared by Dr Robert N Moles Underlining where it occurs is for editorial emphasis]
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This is the Harris case 21 July 2005 - Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)
Lord Justice Gage :General IssuesIn these four appeals, which have been heard together, four carers, as they have been described, appeal against convictions for manslaughter, Lorraine Harris; murder, Raymond Charles Rock; manslaughter, Alan Barry Joseph Cherry; and s.20 inflicting grievous bodily harm, Michael Ian Faulder. The victims were Patrick McGuire, aged 4 months, in the case of Harris; Heidi Smith, aged 13 months, in the case of Rock; Sarah Eburne-Day, aged 21 months, in the case of Cherry; and N, aged 7 weeks, in the case of Faulder. Throughout this judgment we shall refer to the victims by their christian names and to the appellants by their surnames. Patrick was the son of Harris; Heidi was the daughter of Rock's partner; Sarah was the daughter of Cherry's partner; and N was Faulder's son. At the time immediately before each of the victims became seriously ill each was in the sole care respectively of Harris, Rock, Cherry and Faulder. All of the appellants were convicted following trials. On 7 September 2000 at Nottingham Crown Court Harris was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment. On 21 September 1999 at Chelmsford Crown Court Rock was convicted of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. On 9 October 1995 at Birmingham Crown Court Cherry was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 2 years imprisonment. On 28 April 1999 at Teesside Crown Court Faulder was convicted of s.20 inflicting grievous bodily harm and sentenced to 30 months imprisonment. The common thread running through each of these four appeals is a submission that since these convictions medical research has developed to the extent that there is now "fresh evidence" which throws doubt on the safety of each conviction. Following the judgment of this Court in R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1, the Law Officers set up an Interdepartmental Group to review convictions of defendants in alleged "battered babies" cases. As a result of that review letters were sent to Harris and Cherry advising that each might feel it appropriate for the safety of her or his conviction to be considered further by the Court of Appeal. Each lodged notices of appeal and sought extensions of time in which to apply for leave. Each has been granted an extension of time and leave to appeal. Rock had already lodged a notice of appeal. He appeals with the leave of the Court. In the case of Faulder his appeal comes to this Court by way of a reference from the Criminal Cases Review Commission. Mr Michael Mansfield QC is leading counsel for all four appellants. Mr Richard Horwell leads for the Crown in each appeal. These appeals have involved the court receiving (by agreement of the parties) evidence from ten medical expert witnesses called on behalf of the appellants and eleven called on behalf the Crown. We also received the written evidence of four further witnesses. In general terms the issues between the two sets of medical expert witnesses are as follows. First, the evidence called on behalf of the appellants relied on recent research which it is said demonstrated that long held medical opinion of the conventional signs giving rise to inferences of unlawful assaults on infants and very young children is unreliable. The basis of this challenge was a hypothesis based on recent research. However there were also other associated medical issues. The Crown's medical witnesses do not accept that the hypothesis is correct or that it is supported by the new research. Secondly the Crown do not accept that the fresh evidence in relation to other specific issues in any way renders the convictions of these appellants unsafe. The triad and the unified hypothesisAt the heart of these appeals, as they were advanced in the notices of appeal and the appellants' skeleton arguments, was a challenge to the accepted hypothesis concerning "shaken baby syndrome" (SBS); or, as we believe it should be more properly called, non-accidental head injury (NAHI). The accepted hypothesis depends on findings of a triad of intracranial injuries consisting of encephalopathy (defined as disease of the brain affecting the brain's function); subdural haemorrhages (SDH); and retinal haemorrhages (RH). For many years the coincidence of these injuries in infants (babies aged between 1 month and 2 years) has been considered to be the hallmark of NAHI. Not all three of the triad of injuries are necessary for NAHI to be diagnosed, but most doctors who gave evidence to us in support of the triad stated that no diagnosis of pure SBS (as contrasted with impact injuries or impact and shaking) could be made without both encephalopathy and subdural haemmorhages. Professor Carol Jenny, a paediatrician and consultant neuro-trauma specialist called by the Crown, went further and said that she would be very cautious about diagnosing SBS in the absence of retinal haemmorhages. In addition, the Crown points to two further factors of circumstantial evidence, namely that the injuries are invariably inflicted by a sole carer in the absence of any witness; and that they are followed by an inadequate history, incompatible with the severity of the injuries. Between 2000 and 2004 a team of distinguished doctors led by Dr Jennian Geddes, a neuropathologist with a speciality in work with children, produced three papers setting out the results of their research into the triad. In the third paper "Geddes III", the team put forward a new hypothesis, "the unified hypothesis", which challenged the supposed infallibility of the triad. It was called the unified hypothesis because it relied on the proposal that there was one unified cause of the three intracranial injuries constituting the triad; that cause was not necessarily trauma. It is important to note that the new hypothesis did not seek to show that the triad was inconsistent with NAHI. It did, however, seek to show that it was not diagnostic. When Geddes III was published it was, and still is, very controversial. It is not overstating the position to say that this paper generated a fierce debate in the medical profession, both nationally and internationally. In the course of the hearing of these appeals we have heard evidence from a number of very distinguished medical experts with a range of different specialities most of whom had in witness statements expressed views on one side or other of the debate. However, early on in the hearing it became apparent that substantial parts of the basis of the unified hypothesis could no longer stand. Dr Geddes, at the beginning of her cross-examination, accepted that the unified hypothesis was never advanced with a view to being proved in court. She said that it was meant to stimulate debate. Further, she accepted that the hypothesis might not be quite correct; or as she put it: "I think we might not have the theory quite right. I think possibly the emphasis on hypoxia - no, I think possibly we are looking more at raised pressure being the critical event. "And later in her evidence: "Q. Dr Geddes, cases up and down the country are taking place where Geddes III is cited by the defence time and time again as the reason why the established theory is wrong. A. That I am very sorry about. It is not fact; it is hypothesis but, as I have already said, so is the traditional explanation. … I would be very unhappy to think that cases were being thrown out on the basis that my theory was fact. We asked the editor if we could have "Hypothesis Paper" put at the top and he did not, but we do use the word "hypothesis" throughout." Despite these frank admissions the triad and Geddes III have been a focus of much of the medical issues in these appeals. We propose to set out the salient features of each in a little more detail. We do so not only as a backdrop to these appeals but in an effort to inform those involved in future trials as to the current accepted state of medical science, as we understand it from the evidence before us, on some of the very difficult issues which are raised in criminal and civil trials involving allegations of NAHI. The anatomyIn order to explain the two hypotheses it is necessary to set out some of the anatomy involved in terms which can be understood by laymen and which from a medical viewpoint may seem somewhat simplistic. At the outset, in order to assist the reader, we attach as annexes to this judgment a glossary of medical terms (appendix A), and diagrams of the head (appendix B). The brain is encased in three membranes. The one immediately surrounding the brain is the pia mater. The next one is the arachnoid. Between the pia and the arachnoid is an area known as the subarachnoid space. The third membrane, which surrounds the brain and continues down the body surrounding and protecting the spinal cord, is the dura. Between the dura and the arachnoid is the subdural space. Between the dura and the arachnoid there are veins running between the two membranes which are called bridging veins. The brain is divided into two halves or cerebral hemispheres. The two hemispheres are separated by the falx which itself is part of the dura. Below the cerebral hemispheres the brain is joined to the spinal cord at the craniocervical junction, which, as its name implies, is situated in the neck. The spinal cord extends down from the brain, through the foramen magnum and into the spine. The triadAs already stated when the three elements of the triad coincide for some years conventional medical opinion has been that this is diagnostic of NAHI. Typically the brain is found to be encephalopathic; bleeding is found in the subdural space between the dura and the arachnoid subdural haemmorhages; and there are retinal haemorrhages. There may also be other pathological signs such as subarachnoid bleeding and injuries at the cranio-cervical junction. Further, there may be injuries to nerve tissue (axonal injuries) and external signs of broken bones, bruising and other obvious injuries such as extradural oedema (bruising). Determining these findings requires medical experts from a number of different disciplines interpreting often very small signs within the complex structures of an infant's brain and surrounding tissue. The mechanism for these injuries is said to be the shaking of the infant, with or without impact on a solid surface, which moves the brain within the skull damaging the brain and shearing the bridging veins between the dura and the arachnoid. The shaking may also cause retinal haemorrhages. In the sense that the explanation for the triad is said to be caused by shaking and/or impact it also is a unified hypothesis, albeit that each element is said to be caused individually by trauma. The triad of injuries becomes central to a diagnosis of NAHI when there are no other signs or symptoms of trauma such as bruises or fractures. The unified hypothesis ("Geddes III")Dr Geddes and her colleagues, following research into almost fifty paediatric cases without head injury, proposed that the same triad of injuries could be caused by severe hypoxia (lack of oxygen in the tissues) which in turn led to brain swelling. The hypothesis was that brain swelling combined with raised intracranial pressure (ICP) could cause both subdural haemorrhages and retinal haemmorhages. Thus, it was argued that any incidents of apnoea (cessation of breathing) could set in motion a cascade of events which could cause the same injuries as seen in the triad. It will be appreciated that there are many events which could accidentally cause an episode of apnoea. In Geddes III the unified hypothesis was summarised as follows: “Our observations in the present series indicate that, in the immature brain, hypoxia both alone and in combination with infection is sufficient to activate the pathophysiological cascade which culminates in altered vascular permeability and extravasation of blood within and under the dura. In the presence of brain swelling and raised intracranial pressure, vascular fragility and bleeding would be exacerbated by additional hemodynamic forces such as venous hypertension, and the effects of both sustained systemic arterial hypertension and episodic surges in blood pressure. " Thus, it was suggested that all the injuries constituting the triad could be attributed to a cause other than NAHI. We understand that this paper has been much cited in both criminal and civil trials since its publication. The criticism of Geddes III is that it is not hypoxia and/or brain swelling which causes subdural haemorrhages and retinal haemorrhages but trauma. As an example of why the hypothesis is not correct Dr Jaspan, giving evidence in the appeal of Rock, demonstrated that CT scans taken of Heidi's brain showed that there was little or no brain swelling at a time when subdural haemorrhages and retinal haemorrhages were shown to be present. As a result of critical papers published in the medical journals, as we have already stated, Dr Geddes when cross-examined frankly admitted that the unified hypothesis could no longer credibly be put forward. In cross-examination she accepted that she could no longer support the hypothesis that brain swelling was the cause of subdural haemorrhages and retinal haemmorhages. She did, however, state that she believed that raised intracranial pressure (ICP) might prove to be an independent cause of both lesions. When asked by Mr Horwell if she had published a paper on this hypothesis she said that she had not and that her research was still incomplete. It was clear from subsequent questions in cross-examination that this work was still in its early stages and that many questions remain, as yet, unresolved. In our judgment, it follows that the unified hypothesis can no longer be regarded as a credible or alternative cause of the triad of injuries. This conclusion, however, is not determinative of the four appeals before us. There are many other medical issues involved in cases of alleged NAHI. Further, there remains a body of medical opinion which does not accept that the triad is an infallible tool for diagnosis. This body of opinion, whilst recognising that the triad is consistent with NAHI, cautions against its use as a certain diagnosis in the absence of other evidence. These four appeals raise different medical issues and do not necessarily fail because the unified hypothesis has not been validated. But it does mean that the triad, itself a hypothesis, has not been undermined in the way envisaged by the authors of Geddes III. Mr Horwell, in his final submissions invited the Court to find that the triad was proved as a fact and not just a hypothesis. On the evidence before us we do not think it possible for us to do so. Whilst a strong pointer to NAHI on its own we do not think it possible to find that it must automatically and necessarily lead to a diagnosis of NAHI. All the circumstances, including the clinical picture, must be taken into account. In any event, on general issues of this nature, where there is a genuine difference between two reputable medical opinions, in our judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeal will not usually be the appropriate forum for these issues to be resolved. The focus of this Court will be (as ours has been) to decide the safety of the conviction bearing in mind the test in fresh evidence appeals which we set out below. That is not to say that such differences cannot be resolved at trial. At trial, when such issues arise, it will be for the jury (in a criminal trial) and the judge (in a civil trial) to resolve them as issues of fact on all the available evidence in the case (see R v Kai-Whitewind [2005] EWCA 1092). Before we leave Geddes III we must mention some evidence given by the first witness we heard, Dr Waney Squier, a consultant neuropathologist, which was the subject of some further investigation by the Crown's witnesses and further oral evidence. Dr Squier produced a slide taken from the brain of a four week old baby which she said demonstrated blood oozing from the dura into the subdural space. In her opinion this showed that intradural haemorrhages could leak into the subdural space and could be mistaken for subdural haemorrhages caused by shearing of the bridging veins. In that respect it challenged the diagnostic value placed on subdural haemmorhages by the triad. Mr Horwell asked for the slide and other slides made in respect of the same brain to be released for examination by the Crown's experts. We heard evidence in respect of this discrete issue on the last day of evidence. In summary, two paediatric neuropathologists, Dr Rorke-Adams and Dr Harding, said that the slide did not show intradural bleeding but was an example of the process of organisation of an earlier subdural haemorrhage. It is unnecessary for us to go into the detail of this dispute. It is sufficient to say that having heard both sides forcefully express their views we are unable to resolve this issue and find, as Mr Horwell invited us to, that Dr Squier's evidence on it cannot be accepted. We content ourselves with the observation that even on the interpretation of objective evidence there can be two views expressed by highly experienced and distinguished medical experts. Geddes I and IIAlthough, for the reasons already explained, the unified hypothesis can no longer stand as a credible alternative to the triad, a number of issues of general importance in respect of the triad remain. So far we have made no mention of the first two papers produced by Dr Geddes and her co-authors, which we will refer to as Geddes I and Geddes II. These papers represent conclusions reached in respect of research into a cohort of infants all of whom died from inflicted head injuries. Using a technique pioneered by Dr Geddes, the authors sought to identify axonal damage (damage to the nerve tissues) in the brains of these infants. The technique involved detecting the presence of beta-amyloid precursor protein (ß-APP) (a protein that builds up where axons have been damaged). The research showed that widespread axonal damage, interpreted as vascular rather than traumatic, was present in 13 of the 37 cases. Conversely, widespread traumatic axonal damage was found in only 2 cases and in both cases there were other very clear signs of trauma (for example bilateral skull fractures). The authors concluded that their findings strongly suggested that severe traumatic axonal damage is a rarity in infant NAHI unless there is considerable impact, and that the diffuse brain damage which was responsible for loss of consciousness in the majority of cases was caused by starvation of oxygen (hypoxic) rather than direct trauma to the brain. The principle conclusion of Geddes II was that shaking an infant might cause a stretching injury at the cranio-cervical junction to nerves which control the child's cardio-respiratory system. In all the cases analysed the stretch injury itself was survivable, what was life-threatening was the consequent hypoxic injury and brain swelling that followed as a result of the damaged cardio-respiratory nerves failing to function. The minimum degree of shaking force required to produce such a stretch injury is unknown and a death may be caused in the manner suggested by much less force than hitherto supposed. Although the results of this research, as we understand it, are not challenged by those who criticise the unified hypothesis, Mr Horwell submitted that its effect was limited. For instance he submitted that it had no application to, and could not explain, cases involving subdural bleeding and/or retinal haemmorhages. Degree of forceThis leads on to a very important issue which arises in these appeals and will no doubt arise in many cases where the triad of injuries are present. It is the question of how much force is necessary to cause those injuries. There is a measure of common ground between the doctors on this issue. Generally it is agreed that there is no scientific method of correlating the amount of force used and the severity of the damage caused. To state the obvious, it is not possible to carry out experiments on living children. Further, experience shows that the human frame reacts differently in different infants to the same degree of force. However the medical opinion on this issue appears to be divided into those who maintain that severe injuries can confidently be ascribed to a traumatic cause, for example (but not only) Dr Rorke-Adams, a very experienced paediatric neuropathologist, and those who maintain that very little force may cause very serious injuries, for example Dr John Plunkett, a distinguished anatomical, clinical and forensic pathologist. It is quite impossible for this court to make any finding on this issue beyond referring to some general propositions with which both counsel agreed. First, common sense suggests that the more severe the injuries the more probable they will have been caused by greater force than mere "rough handling". We note that the most recent Update from the Ophthalmology Child Abuse Working Party; Royal College of Ophthalmologists (2004) concludes: " It is highly unlikely that the forces required to produce retinal haemorrhage in a child less than 2 years of age would be generated by a reasonable person during the course of (even rough) play or an attempt to arouse a sleeping or apparently unconscious child." Secondly, as Mr Peter Richards, a very experienced neurosurgeon with a speciality in paediatrics, pointed out, if rough handling of an infant or something less than rough handling, commonly caused the sort of injuries which resulted in death, the hospitals would be full of such cases. In our view this points to the fact that cases of serious injuries caused by very minor force such as might occur in normal handling or rough handling of an infant, are likely to be rare or even extremely rare. But, thirdly, as Dr Plunkett demonstrated by his research and in particular by reference to an amateur video of a child falling from a 3 foot high railing, described as part of a play tree-house, which resulted in catastrophic injuries, there will be cases where a small degree of force or a minor fall will cause very severe injuries. We shall have more to say about Dr Plunkett's research later in this judgment, but at this stage we repeat that the evidence suggests that cases where this occurs are likely to be very rare. Fourthly, although the younger the infant or child, the more vulnerable it is likely to be, it is not possible to conclude that age is necessarily a factor in deciding whether injuries are caused by strong force or a minimal degree of force or impact. The balance of the evidence is that, although an infant's skull is more pliable than that of an older child, the internal organs and vessels are as robust as those of an older child. The vulnerability of an infant arises from the fact that its head is generally larger in proportion to its body than in an older child and its neck muscles are weaker and not as well developed as in older children, hence the significance of injuries at the site of the craniocervical junction. BiomechanicsIn simple terms "biomechanics" is the application of traditional engineering principles to living organisms. Many of the experts who gave evidence before us made reference to research in the field of biomechanics. The following extracts from the evidence demonstrate how the 'biomechanics' argument was deployed by both sides. Dr Squier referred to the "huge amount of evidence about the biomechanics" of shaking which had caused her to revise her views on the diagnosis of shaking. Dr Geddes stated that belief that thin film subdural haemorrhages were caused by the rupture of bridging veins was "biomechanically exceptionally unlikely". She relied upon biomechanical research to support the view that shaking on its own cannot cause subdural haemorrhages and retinal haemorrhages without also significant structural damage to the neck and probably also a degree of axonal injury. Dr Plunkett stressed the importance of understanding the mechanics of injury. Dr Adams, referring to biomechanical research by Ommaya, considered that shaking was an improbable direct cause of retinal haemorrhage. Mr Richards warned that, however good the biomechanical calculations may be, they do not always appear to give an answer that is common sense. He went on to stress that limits of current knowledge and understanding: "Nobody really knows whether, when you shake a child, it is just back and forth or there is rotation as well. What does the head do? Does it decelerate against the back? Does it decelerate against the chin? When you put the child down, there must be an element of deceleration. It is a complex problem." Of course none of the witnesses who gave evidence in the appeal was themselves an expert in biomechanics. Such were the number of references to biomechanics during the early days of the hearing that it became inevitable that some direct expert evidence on the subject was required. To that end the appellants filed a report by Dr Thibault and the Crown filed a report by Dr Gina Bertocci (dealing specifically with the case of Cherry). Because of the logistics involved, not least the constraints of time, it was not possible for either of these witnesses to give oral evidence. Consequently we are left to evaluate this important area by comparing and contrasting the views expressed on paper by Dr Thibault and Dr Bertocci. Dr Thibault is a biomechanical engineer whose work has a particular emphasis on "Paediatric Head Injury Mechanics". Dr Thibault is not a doctor of medicine and holds a PhD in mechanical engineering. He has apparently performed experiments that have sought to mirror the age-dependant mechanical behaviour of the infant skull, sutures and brain. Part of the work in this field is to determine the amount of physical force that a living system can tolerate and thereby identify the "injury threshold" or "injury tolerance criteria". When the relevant threshold or criteria is exceeded the system or tissue will fail; for example stress on a bone will cause the bone to fracture if the stress exceeds the injury threshold. Dr Thibault explained that whereas there is a substantial body of research into the mechanics of adult head injury, until recently there has been relatively little similar work in relation to paediatric head injury. He reported: "It has been demonstrated experimentally and validated through real-world accident analysis that various intracranial pathologies result from excessive angular acceleration of the head. In general, angular acceleration of the head creates relative motion between the brain and the skull, causing potentially injurious strain within the intracranial neural and vascular tissues (bridging vessels, deep central white matter). The nature, distribution and severity of the resulting pathology depend not only on the angular acceleration magnitude, but also on its direction, onset rate and duration." Like Dr Plunkett, Dr Thibault (relying on the research of Prange and others) drew attention to the ability of the skull of an infant to react to force by deforming itself and thereby causing internal injury to the brain substance and/or cranial vascular system. In general terms, Dr Thibault joined issue with the conventional view that short falls are a frequent occurrence for young children and serious or fatal injuries from such falls are rare. Recourse is also typically made to information about high speed traffic accidents or falls from two storey buildings. Dr Thibault considered such an approach to be simply "arbitrary, unscientific and meaningless" in that there is no attempt to evaluate the actual loads and forces at play in each individual case, which would need to include data regarding the child's orientation at impact, kinematics (motion) of the body, impact surface and anatomical impact locations. Dr Thibault is clear that impacts arising from falls can result in serious and fatal brain injuries. The appellants rely upon the report of Dr Thibault for the following submissions: The Crown's expert, Dr Bertocci, is also a mechanical engineer by training and is Associate Professor of Biomechanics and Director of the Injury Risk Assessment and Prevention Laboratory in the University of Louisville, Kentucky, USA. Her primary area of research is injury biomechanics in cases of child abuse and paediatric falls. Dr Bertocci's report is very largely focussed upon the Cherry case and is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of the biomechanical factors in play in each of these cases. One general observation that Dr Bertocci, however, made is based upon her research into falls either from ground level or from 9 inches above ground. Her conclusion in this regard is that the forces involved in such falls are well below the threshold said to be required to produce diffuse axonal injury in an infant, suggesting that there is a very low risk of DAI in such falls. In this section of our judgment we have done no more than summarise this evidence. Where such evidence is called by one or other party or both in future litigation it will be for the jury (in a criminal trial) or the judge (in a civil trial) to evaluate it in the light of the cross-examination and all the other evidence. Retinal haemorrhagesRetinal haemorrhage is the third limb of the triad. It will be recalled that Professor Carol Jenny told us that in her view in a case of pure shaking extreme caution should be exercised before a diagnosis of NAHI is made in the absence of retinal haemmorhage. We see the force of this evidence. In cases of injuries alleged to have been caused by an impact or impacts, the evidence suggests that it is not a prerequisite for retinal haemorrhages to be found. Again, we understand the logic of this proposition. It is agreed between the expert ophthalmologists and ophthalmic surgeons that a rapid rise in intracranial pressure can cause retinal haemorrhages although the amount and type of pressure required to cause such haemorrhages is a matter of debate. The appellants' expert ophthalmic surgeon, Dr Gillian Adams, said that retinal haemorrhages could be caused by a spike or surge of venous pressure. Mr Peter Richards said that in his experience of carrying out brain surgery artificially induced very high venous pressure did not cause retinal haemorrhages. Some of the ophthalmic experts stated that retinal haemorrhages caused by shaking or impact demonstrate entirely different characteristics from retinal haemorrhages arising from other causes. Others said that no distinction can be made between retinal haemorrhages arising from different causes. Again, in the context of these appeals, we make no findings in respect of these differences of opinion. In future cases before a criminal or civil court, the type and extent of retinal haemorrhage and its place in the constellations of symptoms will be a matter for the court to evaluate in each individual case. We bear them in mind when reaching our conclusions in these four appeals. We also bear in mind Mr Horwell's submission that the real question in these appeals is how much force is necessary to cause not just one element of the triad but all three. The Law The principles on which this Court should act in appeals involving fresh evidence are not in dispute. They were clearly set out in R v Pendleton [2001] UKHL 66. They were repeated in a recent case in the Privy Council: Dial and another v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] 1 WLR 1660: "31 In the board's view the law is now clearly established and can be simply stated as follows. Where fresh evidence is adduced on a criminal appeal it is for the Court of Appeal, assuming always that it accepts it, to evaluate its importance in the context of the remainder of the evidence in the case. If the court concludes that the fresh evidence raises no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused it will dismiss the appeal. The primary question is for the court itself and is not what effect the fresh evidence would have had on the mind of the jury. That said, if the court regards the case as a difficult one, it may find it helpful to test its view "by asking whether the evidence, if given at the trial, might reasonably have affected the decision of the trial jury to convict": R v Pendleton [2002] 1 WLR 72. The guiding principle nevertheless remains that stated by Viscount Dilhorne in Staffords case [1974] AC 878, 906, and affirmed by the House in R v Pendleton:" While… the Court of Appeal and this House may find it a convenient approach to consider what a jury might have done if they had heard the fresh evidence, the ultimate responsibility rest with them and them alone for deciding the question [whether or not the verdict is unsafe]" That is the principle correctly and consistently applied nowadays by the criminal division of the Court of Appeal in England – see, for example, R v Hakala [2002] EWCA Crim 730, R v Hanratty, decd [2002] 3 ALL ER 534 and R v Ishtiaq Ahmed [2002] EWCA Crim 2781. It was neatly expressed by Judge LJ in R v Hakala, at para 11, thus: "However the safety of the appellant's conviction is examined, the essential question, and ultimately the only question for this court, is whether, in the light of the fresh evidence, the convictions are unsafe." Mr Mansfield QC also drew our attention to passages in the judgments of this court in R v Cannings [2004] 2Cr. App. R.7 and R v Kai-Whitewind [2005] EWCA 1092. In particular in opening he referred to Cannings: "These observations serve to highlight the second problem which can arise in this case, and case like Sally Clark and Trupti Patel. We have read bundles of reports from numerous experts of great distinction in this field, together with transcripts of their evidence. If we have derived an overwhelming and abiding impression from studying this material, it is that a great deal about death in infancy, and its causes, remain as yet unknown and undiscovered. That impression is confirmed by counsel on both sides. Much work by dedicated men and women is devoted to this problem. No doubt one urgent objective is to reduce to an irreducible minimum the tragic waste of life and consequent life-scarring grief suffered by parents. In the process however much will also be learned about those deaths which are not natural, and are indeed the consequence of harmful parental activity. We cannot avoid the thought that some of the honest views expressed with reasonable confidence in the present case (on both sides of the argument) will have to be revised in years to come, when the fruits of continuing medical research, both hear and internationally, become available. What may be unexplained today may be perfectly well understood tomorrow. Until then, any tendency to dogmatise should be met with an answering challenge". But as the court was careful to point out this does not mean that fanciful doubts are a basis for rejecting expert evidence. With the general observations, referred to above and the legal principles in mind, we turn to the individual appeals. Furthermore, the limits of Cannings and its proper use were carefully explored in Kai-Whitewind, in observations with which we wholeheartedly agree. Final CommentsIn earlier sections of this judgment we have made comments on the triad of injuries, the "unified hypothesis" – Geddes I, II, III, and some general issues. We do not think it possible or desirable to add anything further to those observations. In our judgment, these appeals demonstrate that cases of alleged NAHI are fact-specific and will be determined on their individual facts. We have been asked by Mr Horwell to give some guidance in respect of expert witnesses in cases such as these. In his final submissions Mr Horwell submitted that these appeals demonstrated that there had been a significant failure within the criminal justice system to control and manage expert evidence. He argued that there must be a change in approach and invited the court to consider giving guidance. Whether or not there has been a failure by the criminal justice system to control and manage expert evidence we are reluctant to give any new guidance on expert evidence arising from the facts of these cases. It may, however, be helpful to re-iterate current guidance. As to expert evidence generally, the evidential rules as to admissibility are clear (see for example R v Bonython [1984] 38 SASR 45 and R v Clarke (RL) [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 425 (facial mapping)). We see no reason for special rules where medical experts are involved. There is no single test which can provide a threshold for admissibility in all cases. As Clarke demonstrates developments in scientific thinking and techniques should not be kept from the Court. Further, in our judgment, developments in scientific thinking should not be kept from the Court, simply because they remain at the stage of a hypothesis. Obviously, it is of the first importance that the true status of the expert's evidence is frankly indicated to the court. It may be helpful for judges, practitioners and experts to be reminded of the obligations of an expert witness summarised by Cresswell J in the Ikerian Reefer [1993] 2 Lloyds Rep. 68 at p 81. Cresswell J pointed out amongst other factors the following, which we summarise as follows: (1) Expert evidence presented to the court should be and seen to be the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation. (2) An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the court by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise. An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the role of advocate. (3) An expert witness should state the facts or assumptions on which his opinion is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which detract from his concluded opinions. (4) An expert should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his expertise. (5) If an expert's opinion is not properly researched because he considers that insufficient data is available then this must be stated with an indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one. (6) If after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes his view on material matters, such change of view should be communicated to the other side without delay and when appropriate to the court. Wall J, as he then was, sitting in the Family Division also gave helpful guidance for experts giving evidence involving children (see Re AB (Child Abuse: Expert Witnesses) [1995] 1 FLR 181 ). Wall J pointed out that there will be cases in which there is a genuine disagreement on a scientific or medical issue, or where it is necessary for a party to advance a particular hypothesis to explain a given set of facts. He added (see page 192): "Where that occurs, the jury will have to resolve the issue which is raised. Two points must be made. In my view, the expert who advances such a hypothesis owes a very heavy duty to explain to the court that what he is advancing is a hypothesis, that it is controversial (if it is) and placed before the court all material which contradicts the hypothesis. Secondly, he must make all his material available to the other experts in the case. It is the common experience of the courts that the better the experts the more limited their areas of disagreement, and in the forensic context of a contested case relating to children, the objective of the lawyers and the experts should always be to limit the ambit of disagreement on medical issues to the minimum." We have substituted the word jury for judge in the above passage. In our judgment the guidance given by both Cresswell J and Wall J are very relevant to criminal proceedings and should be kept well in mind by both prosecution and defence. The new Criminal Procedure Rules provide wide powers of case management to the Court. Rule 24 and Paragraph 15 of the Plea and Case Management form make provision for experts to consult together and, if possible, agree points of agreement or disagreement with a summary of reasons. In cases involving allegations of child abuse the judge should be prepared to give directions in respect of expert evidence taking into account the guidance to which we have just referred. If this guidance is borne in mind and the directions made are clear and adhered to, it ought to be possible to narrow the areas of dispute before trial and limit the volume of expert evidence which the jury will have to consider. We see nothing new in the above observations. Lastly, we wish to express our gratitude to all counsel, solicitors and the many expert witnesses for the prodigious amount of work and time which they have given to these appeals. Cases of this sort raise difficult and complex medical issues. The Court is very dependent upon the skill of the advocates and the ability of the witnesses to elucidate the evidence and inform the court on the issues involved. We have received enormous assistance from all concerned and pay tribute to their efforts.
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