R v Robert Allan Haddon UK Court of Appeal 2003

This version of the judgment has been prepared by: Dr Robert N Moles and Bibi Sangha
Underlining where it occurs is for editorial emphasis]

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Court of Appeal - Monday, 27th January 2003

The Vice President

In January 1980, Haddon was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. A further count on the indictment, to which Haddon pleaded guilty, was of sexual intercourse with a 14 year old girl, and for that he was sentenced to 9 months concurrently. A co-accused, Joy Rahman, was found not guilty, by direction, in relation to the first count, which alleged murder. Her plea of guilty to causing grievous bodily harm with intent, was accepted by the Crown and she was made the subject of a care order.

In January 1981 the Court of Appeal dismissed Haddon's application for leave to appeal against conviction. He now appeals on a reference by the CCRC on a single ground, namely, new psychiatric evidence from Dr Walsh and Dr Clark, which indicates that Haddon was, at the time of the death of the baby, to which in a moment we shall come, suffering from a personality disorder of a character giving rise to a defence of diminished responsibility.

The victim was the 10 week old daughter of Haddon and the co-accused. At the time of trial Haddon was 22 and the co-accused 15. The baby died on 18th February 1979 from bronchopneumonia, which was the consequence of a severe fracture of the skull, sustained about a week earlier. There was evidence from a pathologist that the injury had almost certainly been caused by the child being held by the legs and swung against a hard surface. There was also evidence of fractures and other injuries to the baby, which were revealed by X-ray a few days after Haddon had been arrested and he was not interviewed about those other non fatal injuries.

So far as the fatal injury was concerned, Haddon admitted hitting the baby on the head but, he said, only with his hand, and he maintained that he had never intended to kill or seriously harm her.

He was arrested on suspicion of murder on the afternoon of 19th February. When he was told of the severe head injuries revealed by the postmortem, he said "It's my temper, I lose my temper". He said that he could not stand her crying, his temper kept going and, when it went, he hit her and hit her. He said that the head had swelled up after he had hit her. He claimed only to have hit her with his hand but to have done so really hard. The co-accused, he said, had never hit her.

In the course of the evidence which he gave before the jury, he denied inflicting the fatal injuries. But, if he did, he said he had no intention to cause really serious injury. He had never hit the baby with a hard object or thrown her against something hard or mishandled her in any way. He did, in the course of his evidence, make certain allegations against the co-accused that she had neglected the baby during a period prior to the baby's death.

The only medical report obtained at the time of trial was from Dr Washbrook, the prison doctor, who reported in August 1979. That report concluded that, although Haddon had been brought up in very poor circumstances, and dislocation and emotional deprivation had been the hallmarks of his formative years, he showed no abnormality in attitude, mind, manner or behaviour and there was no evidence of mental illness. His IQ was within the dull / normal range. He was clinically immature and emotionally retarded but there was no history of disturbed behaviour sufficient to warrant a diagnosis of psychopathic disorder. There was a social enquiry report, which referred to Haddon having been sent, at the age of 14, to a classified school, following repeated bullying by him of younger children. He was referred to in that report as "a withdrawn immature young man, of low intelligence, who was emotionally insecure".

Mr Gledhill, on behalf of Haddon, without objection by the Crown, has called Dr Walsh and Dr Clark to give evidence. The stance of the Crown at the opening of the appeal was that they wished, perfectly properly, to test the evidence of those two doctors. In the course of a careful cross-examination of both of them, by Miss Curnow, many features of Haddon's history, as revealed by the abundant records upon him which have accumulated during the 22 years or so of his incarceration, have been explored.

Very properly, at the conclusion of her cross-examination of the second of the doctors, Miss Curnow, on behalf of the Crown, accepted that, as she put it, "patently, if this evidence had been available at trial, it would have led to a different verdict".

In the light of that entirely proper and realistic stance, the substance of the evidence given by the two doctors, and the circumstances in which their reports came to be made, can be very shortly rehearsed. Dr Walsh a consultant psychiatric reported in June 1998, at the request of Haddon's solicitors, in relation to a Parole Board hearing. For it is one of the striking features of this case that, although the tariff period recommended that he should serve at the time of trial was one of 10 years he is, as is apparent from what we have already said, still incarcerated.

Dr Walsh's opinion, in June 1998, was that Haddon suffered from a severe personality disorder, with elements of a number of specific personality disorders as defined in the tenth revision of the International Classification of Diseases (mental and behavioural disorders) colloquially refer to as ICD 10. Dr Walsh pointed out that personality disorders, particularly if unmodified by therapeutic intervention, tend to remain stable over time, and, in adults, are usually traceable to adverse childhood experiences. She took the view that Haddon's disturbed and deprived early life was clearly relevant to his development of the severe disorder which she identified.

In her view, he came within three categories of personality disorder as defined by ICD 10, namely, anxious personality disorder, dissocial personality disorder and paranoid personality disorder. She pointed out that his psychological difficulties had long been recognised and his medical reports showed on-going concern for his mental state. She concluded that he would continue to pose a risk to women with whom he came into contact and to any children for whom he had responsibility. In Dr Walsh's opinion Haddon, at the time of the offence, had suffered from the severe personality disorder from which he still suffered and this constituted an abnormality of mind in the terms of section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957. In consequence, his mental responsibility for his acts would have been impaired substantially by a number of feature, including feelings of intense jealously towards his partner and child, difficulty in relating to and respecting the baby as a separate other, mood instability, social phobia and mounting sense of feeling overwhelmed by the problems which he faced in the parenting task in the relation to this child. She concluded that his condition would meet the criteria for psychopathic disorder within the definition of the Mental Health Act 1983.

Other psychiatric reports were obtained from Dr Resnick on 9th September 1999 and Professor Duggan on 29th March 2000, to which it is unnecessary, for present purposes, to refer.

The CCRC obtained a report from Dr Clark, a consultant forensic psychiatrist at Rampton Hospital, approved also by the purposes of section 12 of the Mental Health Act. The CCRC very properly with Dr Clark, as they did also with Dr Walsh, a number of specific questions in relation to the conclusions of the two doctors about Haddon's mental state at the time of trial. The CCRC were, understandably in the light of the authorities in this Court, which require a degree of scepticism to be exercised in relation to psychiatrically based defences advanced many years after trial, anxiously explored among other matters, whether Haddon's state of mind, as it now presents, might have developed subsequently to the time of trial, by reason of his incarceration. The CCRC also, very properly, explored the question of whether or not the doctors might be being manipulated by Haddon in his account of matters, which necessarily, formed a central plank leading to the conclusions of both doctors.

It is to be noted that the classification and criteria now set out in ICD 10 were not available at the time of Dr Washbrook's report. It is also to be noted that, in the course of her evidence, Dr Walsh expressed the view that Dr Washbrook's reference to clinical immaturity and emotional retardation would, to her mind, have rung alarm bells as they were features indicative of personality disorders and would in her judgment have required further investigation. (The CCRC sought to obtain the views of Dr Washbrook, but was unable to obtain any response to its letters). Dr Walsh expressed the view that there was nothing to show any inconsistency in Haddon's account. On the contrary, one of its striking features has been its marked consistency over the years. We interpose the comment that, at the time of trial, Haddon was denying having caused the injuries to the baby. But it was not very long after the trial that he admitted the he had indeed caused them.

In a second report, in June 2001, Dr Walsh dealt with the questions posed by the CCRC and she adhered to the conclusions which she had expressed in her 1998 report.

She said that, although Haddon's mental health appeared to have deteriorated during his time in prison, the manifestation and pattern of his personality disorder had become clearer and some of the traits more marked. But the basic disorder, which had not been appreciated at the time of the trial, although it was present at the time of the offence, was unchanged. She referred, for example, to the fact that Haddon's jealousy of his daughter did not emerge at trial could be explained by shame and fear of punishment and lack of perception. But he has, in more recent times, come clearly to express that jealousy. She concluded that it was unlikely that he was trying to manipulate his circumstances. She also expressed the view that Haddon may well initially, that is to say by the time of trial, have understated his jealousy of the child's mother. That jealousy might have compounded and increased his hostility towards the child.

Her conclusion, to which she adhered in the evidence before this Court, was that Haddon was, at the time of the offence, suffering from an abnormality of the mind, of the kind which we have already identified, which substantially impaired his responsibility.

Before Dr Clark reported he had no prior discussion with Dr Walsh. Indeed Dr Walsh only saw Dr Clark's report a couple of days ago and there was no discussion between them before they each compiled their respective reports. Dr Clark reached a similar conclusion to Dr Walsh, namely, that Haddon was suffering from a personality disorder, within the criteria in ICD 10, at the time of the offence. Dr Clark considered not only Haddon's account but various objective assessments which were unequivocal in identifying abnormalities in Haddon's relationships and functionings. He fulfilled, in Dr Clark's view, three of the criteria for paranoid personality disorder, within ICD 10, (whereas four are needed for a full diagnosis), and he met the relevant criteria for anxious personality disorder.

His personality disorder was linked to abnormally aggressive and seriously irresponsible behaviour towards the baby and his personality disorder should therefore be defined as a psychopathic disorder. That disorder would have existed, he said in evidence to this Court, from Haddon's late teenage years. Therefore it was almost certainly present at the time of the offence. He said there is no other explanation for accounts for his behaviour other than long-standing personality disorder, which cannot be accounted for simply by the effects of incarceration. His feelings of anger, irritability and jealousy were of an entirely different nature and degree from the ordinary frustrations and emotions of a young father.

So far as Dr Washbrook's report was concerned, Dr Clark drew attention to the likelihood that Haddon at the time was unable or unwilling to discuss those matters which are now relied on as demonstrating the personality disorder from which he suffers. Dr Clark referred to the disorder as a profound one existing at the time of the offence, but not then appreciated and which had only become more manifest over time.

In the light of that evidence, this Court is of the clear view that, had a jury had such evidence before them, they are unlikely to have convicted Haddon of murder. That being so, this appeal is allowed. His conviction of murder is quashed and, exercising the powers which we have, under section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, we enter a verdict of the lesser offence of manslaughter, by reason of diminished responsibility.

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