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A state of Injustice - Dr Robert N Moles
Chapter Fifteen - This is not good enough

A state of Injustice: table of contents

Also by Dr Moles - Losing Their Grip - The Case of Henry Keogh - Definition and Rule in Legal Theory

Responses to miscarriages of justice

The desired result of a criminal trial is that justice be done; that is, that the accused should receive a fair trial according to law. A miscarriage of justice occurs when there is a failure to achieve that result. [1]] And every time there is a miscarriage of justice our legal system loses credibility as a finder of truth, and each of us may become that little bit more insecure. Each time it happens, the system can become weaker and more vulnerable unless the issues are tackled and resolved.

In this book we have looked at a range of cases that have occurred in South Australia over a number of years – cases which we believe, based on the issues that we have touched on, give cause for concern as to the justice of the outcome. These cases go back some 30 years and must lead us to wonder, ‘Is this good enough?’

Our analysis of the cases in question shows that unreliable pathology evidence was significant in a proportion of them, and one must ask, ‘Why is this so?’ In 1993, in a paper entitled ‘Is this the best we can do?’ the Honourable Gordon Samuels AC, QC, then a judge of the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of New South Wales, said:

“In cases … in which a conviction has been obtained in circumstances where it must be assumed that the jury were strongly influenced in their conclusion by scientific evidence which appeared to be beyond rebuttal, but later turns out to be seriously flawed, there are, plainly enough, two problems which call for solution. The first is how, and how quickly, can we establish that a miscarriage of justice has occurred and correct its consequences? The second is how do we prevent such a thing from happening? [2]

This, in our view, aptly describes the situation in South Australia. It raises the two questions with which this book is concerned. This chapter looks at the question, ‘How, and how quickly, can we establish that a miscarriage of justice has occurred and correct its consequences?’ We will do so particularly in relation to the cases involving pathology evidence.

The next chapter, addresses the question, ‘How do we prevent such a thing from happening?’

As discussed earlier, the cases we are concerned about involving pathology cover some 30 years, and a common factor in them is the work of Dr Colin Manock. In these cases he was put forward as a person with substantial experience, and even as an expert witness who was highly qualified. Although his evidence did not go unchallenged – for example, in the Van Beelen case his position on time of death based on stomach contents was vigorously contested – this was often regarded as just the normal clash of opinion between experts. However, on a proper analysis, it can seen that the problems went deeper than that.

It is possible that if the pathology and investigation procedures had been properly examined in the early 1970s, then the situations which later occurred in the Akritidis case, in the Niewdach and Ellis case, in the Highfold, Dixon and Marshall cases, in the Baby Deaths cases, and in the Keogh case in particular, might have been averted.

It is instructive to compare the situation of Dr Manock with that of Dr Clift, a forensic biologist in the United Kingdom. At about the same time that concerns were beginning to be raised about pathology and investigation procedures in South Australia, similar issues were being raised about Dr Clift. Yet while Dr Clift was suspended and an inquiry was held into his work, no similar inquiries were conducted into the problems in South Australia.

Dr Alan Clift was an experienced biologist at a Home Office forensic science laboratory. He was a founder member of The Forensic Science Society (UK) and its treasurer. In 1977 he was suspended after a routine internal check and a case in which he was due to give evidence was suddenly dropped. [3] The Home Office asked the police to investigate. Their report went to the Director of Public Prosecutions, who decided to take no action. In 1979 Dr Clift was asked to provide comments on six of his cases. His replies were considered to be unsatisfactory.

Following another case in which Dr Clift’s evidence was successfully challenged in court, the Home Office asked another forensic scientist to investigate. Margaret Pereira, a director of one of the Home Office forensic science laboratories, produced a report in November 1979. It concluded:

“In many ways Dr Clift’s attitudes reflect those of the very early forensic scientists who saw their function as one of ‘helping the police’ and not as I believe a modern forensic scientist would see it (a) to assist police in their investigations and (b) to assist in the cause of justice in the courts.“[4]

Ms Pereira said that it was incumbent on forensic scientists to be totally honest about their findings, and not to edit them in a way that might be prejudicial to either the prosecution or the defence. Dr Clift, on the other hand, had said that police officers were the scientists’ customers and that it was the view of some senior police officers that the job of the scientists was to find evidence which might contribute to police inquiries.

The most high profile of the cases which led to concerns about Dr Clift’s work was that of Mr Preece, who had been convicted in the High Court in Edinburgh in June 1973 for the murder of Mrs Will. An important aspect of the evidence given by Dr Clift was based on his analysis of a stain containing semen found on the victim’s underwear. He said it pointed to the killer being a person who was a blood group A secretor (as Preece was). A secretor is a person that secretes detectable levels of their ABO blood group substances in their bodily fluids, such as saliva, semen or vaginal secretions, and this allows their blood group to be identified. However, Dr Clift failed to mention that Mrs Will also had the same blood group and thus it was not possible to definitively determine that the blood grouping in the stain came from the semen.

In March 1981, the Scottish Secretary (equivalent to the Attorney General in South Australia) referred the Preece case to the Scottish Court of Criminal Appeal for review. The court spent four days re-examining the crucial forensic evidence. The court said that ‘Dr Clift expressed his confident opinion that the donor of semen was an A secretor in a wholly misleading way’. The court also said that Clift did not disclose the victim’s blood group, or possible secretor status, and that he knew that it was impossible for the defence to discover this for themselves.

Dr Clift’s justification for the failure to disclose these important matters was that he took them into account in employing a theory, born of his own experience, in interpreting the results on mixed stains. That theory did not at the time, and it still does not, have support from any reputable scientific authority. The Lord Justice General said of Dr Clift:

“This was conduct on the part of an expert witness which demonstrated a complete misunderstanding of scientific witnesses in our courts and a lack of the essential qualities of accuracy and scientific objectivity which are normally to be taken for granted.” [5]

The court reached the conclusion that Dr Clift was discredited as a scientist. The prosecution conceded as much. The judge went on to say: ‘We are convinced, beyond all reasonable doubt, that no reasonable jury would have convicted once it had become clear … that Dr Clift was discredited not only as a scientist but as a witness.’ [6]

The court allowed Mr Preece’s appeal and quashed his conviction. By that stage, he had been imprisoned for eight years for killing a woman that he said he had never met. He had lost his marriage, his home and his job.

The Ombudsman was critical of the time it took to review Mr Preece’s case. He was also critical of the fact that there had not been a review of Dr Clift’s cases when the issue of his incompetence was first raised. A senior civil servant at the time said that there was no onus on them to take the initiative to trawl through his cases.

There was, however, a subsequent inquiry that lasted two years and looked into 1500 cases in which Dr Clift had given evidence. Sixteen convicted people, including four serving life sentences, one of whom had been in prison for sixteen years, were to have their cases reopened because of serious doubts about the evidence of Dr Clift.

A Member of Parliament said that he found the whole thing very disturbing. Dr Clift, he said, had worked for the forensic service for 24 years and gave evidence in some 5000 cases.

There were at least two very important outcomes from the Preece inquiry as far as lawyers and expert witnesses were concerned. For expert witnesses (be they scientists or pathologists) it was made clear that everything relevant must be disclosed in their written reports, and that they should refer to the weakness as well as the strength of the evidence, whether asked or not. Their reports must be sufficiently comprehensive as to convey a fair understanding of the evidence.

As for lawyers, the important lesson to be learned is that they must carry out their function diligently and grapple with the scientific evidence. It is vital that they be alert to both what is said and what is not said. If lawyers fail to understand the importance and the consequences of the expert evidence, and fail to have it thoroughly tested, all sorts of injustices may follow for their clients. [7]

The Royal Commission into the Splatt case concluded in South Australia in 1984, only a few years after the Preece appeal in the United Kingdom. Like Preece, the Splatt Commission had significant outcomes for lawyers and expert witnesses. We have already referred to some of these outcomes (the proper role of expert witnesses, the proper role of lawyers) in the chapter on the criminal justice system, and they are quite similar to those of Preece. The ramifications of the Splatt Commission resulted in the formation of a single integrated Forensic Science Centre in Adelaide. The Commissioner’s recommendations were adopted – checking of observations, good documentation and peer review – and in 1990 the scientific operations of the centre became the first non-United States laboratory to gain accreditation through the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors – Laboratory Accreditation Board quality assurance program.

However, the Splatt inquiry was seen to be only about how forensic science was done, and the principles were not applied to forensic pathology. Thus, later, there was to be no checking of the autopsy observations in the Baby Deaths cases and no peer review of the interpretations of the observations. In the Keogh case, no pathologist other than Dr Manock had the chance to view the body of Anna Cheney and confirm his findings before it was cremated.

Another example that shows preparedness to tackle difficult cases and problems with witnesses involves the doctors, Professor Sir Roy Meadow and Dr Alan Williams in the United Kingdom. Dr Williams was the original pathologist in the case of Sally Clark. He initially diagnosed that Mrs Clark’s first child died naturally of a lung infection. When her second child died, Dr Williams determined that the child had been killed. He then changed his mind regarding the first child, saying that it too had been killed. Mrs Clark was tried for double murder. Sir Roy Meadow, a professor of child health with some 25 years experience, was called as an expert in child deaths. He gave persuasive evidence, as he had in the past, that given the statistics on such deaths, the deaths had to be murder. Mrs Clark was convicted and imprisoned.

However, she was subsequently released following an appeal in which it was demonstrated that Sir Roy Meadow was wrong and that his theory concerning the deaths was not supported by any scientific evidence. It was also established that Dr Williams did not disclose to the court evidence that the second child had a deadly bacterial infection and most likely died from natural causes. Sir Roy Meadow gave evidence in another baby death trial which resulted in the imprisonment of the mother, but she too was acquitted on appeal. He also provided an opinion in another case that resulted in a mother’s second baby being taken from her at birth and adopted out after her first child had died in mysterious circumstances. He did this without any contact with the parents – they did not see him until he gave his evidence in court. [8]

The General Medical Council, which registers United Kingdom doctors, is reported to be investigating Sir Roy Meadow. Their Preliminary Procedures Committee has determined that the allegations against him, if proved, would raise a question of serious professional misconduct which would affect his fitness to practice. [9] It has also been reported that the British government is considering undertaking a review of all cases involving evidence from Sir Roy Meadow and from Dr Williams. [10]

The Criminal Cases Review Commission

In the period following the Preece appeal, there were a number of notorious cases in the United Kingdom in which there were concerns about the justice of the outcome. Some were cases relating to apparent terrorist activities. In 1991, after the overturning of the convictions in the cases of the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four, the government set up a Royal Commission (The Runciman Commission) charged with examining the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in securing the conviction of the guilty and the acquittal of the innocent. One of the commission's key recommendations was the creation of an independent body, the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC), to take on the responsibilities to investigate alleged miscarriages of justice in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. [11]

The principal role of the CCRC is to review the convictions and sentences of those who claim to be victims of a miscarriage of justice, and to determine whether or not the cases brought before them should be referred back to the appropriate appeal court. The CCRC started casework at the beginning of April 1997. Since then it has reviewed allegations of some of the most serious miscarriages of justice going back to the 1950s. Prior to the formation of the CCRC, applications for the review of criminal convictions were made to the Home Secretary, who could refer cases to the Court of Appeal.

The commission is a last resort. It cannot normally consider any case until it has been through the appeal system. This means that applicants should have already filled in a notice of appeal. If that appeal fails, or if leave to appeal is refused, the CCRC can become involved.

The task is to examine each case impartially and decide whether it would have a real possibility of succeeding if it were given a further hearing in an appeal court. Sometimes a decision can be reached based on the information given in the application form or other correspondence. More often, it may be necessary to call for further information or carry out an investigation. Some cases are dealt with entirely by members of the CCRC and caseworkers. If a case calls for special knowledge – for example, about engineering, medicine or video analysis – the CCRC can instruct an expert to examine the evidence and report on it. If the case depends on materials held by a public body, the CCRC can instruct that body to keep the materials safe and to allow the CCRC to inspect them.

The CCRC has no powers to carry out searches of premises, to check criminal records, to use police computers or to make an arrest. However, it can appoint an investigating officer, such as a senior police officer, who has those powers. By regular monitoring and review, it keeps strict control over whoever is appointed and how they conduct the investigation.

Once the investigations are complete, the CCRC informs the applicants of what it has learned so that they have an opportunity to comment before it makes its decision.

The CCRC's involvement in the matter ends once the case is referred back to the Court of Appeal. From that point it is up to the applicants and their legal representatives to present a persuasive case to convince the court. If an application is not referred to the court and more evidence is later uncovered, or a new line of argument appears, there is nothing to prevent a further application to the CCRC.

For a case to be referred to the Court of Appeal there must generally be evidence or arguments that were not considered at the original trial or appeal. Convictions and sentences are referred if the CCRC believes that there is a real possibility that they will be found to be unsafe or unsatisfactory. A high proportion of the applications involve only simple points of fact or law, and can be reviewed within a month or two. Where there are complex issues to investigate, the review may take a year or more. Final decisions about referrals are made by the commission members, either singly, or in three-member committees.

The CCRC members include people with high-level experience in business, industry and government, as well as those with legal and forensic experience. It is of particular interest that David Jessel, the investigative reporter who is probably best known for his work since 1985 as the presenter of Rough Justice (BBC) and Trial and Error (Channel 4), has been a member. Many of the cases featured in his programs have been referred to the Court of Appeal, which has resulted in convictions being set aside.

The necessity of having a body such as the CCRC as part of the criminal justice system can be seen from the fact that 64 of the first 94 cases the commission referred to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration were upheld as constituting miscarriages of justice. There have been four cases where those convicted were hanged after conviction, but have subsequently had their convictions overturned. In the first two years, more than 4000 applications were made to the CCRC for it to consider. By the end of the third year of operation, some two thirds of the cases referred back to the courts were found to be miscarriages of justice.

The following is a small selection of cases that have been overturned by the United Kingdom Court of Appeal through this process. They indicate the sorts of reasons that have resulted in convictions being quashed. What is interesting is that they reflect the types of issues which are raised by the South Australian cases discussed in this book.

Mahmood Mattan was convicted of murder in 1952 and was hanged. After a reference by the CCRC, the conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal in 1998. The judges ruled that the conviction was unsafe because the evidence of the main prosecution witness was unreliable. There was a serious concern that it was the witness and not Mattan who had committed the original offence.

Nineteen year old educationally sub-normal Derek Bentley was convicted in 1952 of the murder of Constable Sidney Miles and was hanged. In 1993 the Queen granted a posthumous pardon to Bentley, limited to sentence. The CCRC referred the case to the Court of Appeal and the conviction was quashed in 1998. In his judgment, the Lord Chief Justice ruled that there had been a number of significant misdirections to the jury by the trial judge.

John Taylor was convicted of burglary and given a five-year sentence after a trial in 1962. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction on the grounds that Taylor had been inadequately represented at the original trial.

Patrick Nicholls was convicted in 1975 of robbery and murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction on the basis of new pathology evidence which indicated that the ‘victim’ had died from natural causes.

John Kamara was convicted of the murder in 1981 of the manager of a betting shop. A Home Office review of his case, conducted with the assistance of the police, failed to discover any new evidence. The case was transferred to the CCRC and during their review it was discovered that 201 documents, some of which could have been used by defence counsel at the trial, had not been disclosed by the prosecution. Additionally, witnesses, who had been volunteers on the identity parade at which Kamara was picked out, provided new evidence which suggested that the process had been deeply flawed. Following a three-day hearing, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in 2000, declaring that it had been a ‘difficult, worrying and complex’ case.

Trevor Campbell was convicted in 1985 of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court of Appeal ruled that the conviction was unsafe on the basis that the trial jury was required to make a choice between the credibility of evidence given by Campbell and that given by three police officers. The jury had been unaware of matters which cast severe doubt on the honesty and professional integrity of those officers.

Danny McNamee was convicted in 1987 of conspiracy to cause explosions. The prosecution case linked McNamee by fingerprints to caches of IRA arms and explosives, to an explosion in Hyde Park in 1982 and to a bomb found in London in 1983. The case was eventually transferred to the CCRC which referred it to the Court of Appeal. The conviction was quashed in 1998, the court ruling that the verdict was unsafe because there had been a failure to disclose relevant evidence, even though the impact of the fresh evidence was not conclusive.

Michael O’Brien, Ellis Sherwood and Darren Hall were convicted in 1988 of murder and robbery. All three were sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder, with additional custody for the robbery. In 1999 the Court of Appeal ruled that the convictions were unsafe and overturned them. At the trial, Hall had given evidence that implicated all three men. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that a jury might have taken a different view of the reliability of Hall's evidence if they had heard the new medical evidence and the unsatisfactory way in which the police interviews were conducted.

Mary Druhan was convicted in 1989 of the murders of two men who died in a fire at a house used by squatters. She was sentenced to life imprisonment for each count, to run concurrently. The case was passed to the CCRC in 1997 and referred to the Court of Appeal in 1998. The convictions were quashed because the evidence of a main prosecution witness was unreliable.

Our legal system

The English trial system enjoys an enviable reputation for integrity and fairness and it is has even been said that this system of justice is the finest in the world. [12] However, the situation we have just described regarding the CCRC would suggest that the system has had significant problems, particularly with regard to criminal matters involving expert witnesses. The Australian legal system is based closely on that of the England and Wales so it could also be expected to suffer from many of the same difficulties. Many authors have considered this matter. [13] Many feel that the problems stem from the adversarial (or accusatorial) nature of the system, and that justice would be better served in an inquisitorial legal system. [14]

The inquisitorial or ‘civil’ systems of law are based on Roman law and tend to be used in one form or another by continental European countries (and are therefore sometimes referred to as ‘Continental’ systems). In contrast, the adversarial system of English law with its jury is a more recent invention, going back only 300 years or so. [15]

It is argued that an inquisitorial system is more appropriate in determining the truth in matters involving scientific evidence. This may well be so; an adversarial trial is not a pursuit of truth in the fullest sense. [16] This in part is because it asks a very limited question; it asks, for example, ‘Did this particular person murder this other person?’ While it is a practical inquiry into truth, it inquires only into the truth of particular facets of a whole problem. An inquisitorial system asks the more general question: ‘Who murdered the person?’ This is not an unfamiliar approach in Australia as this type of inquiry already operates in the Coroner’s Court, where it seems to work well. Professional conduct tribunals and medical boards have similar powers. Royal Commissions are also of this nature. Inquiries of this type in cases such as Chamberlain and Splatt (in which the case effectively has been retried) have proved their worth.

A survey of the ministries of justice and/or leading newspapers in eleven countries of Western Europe, all of which operate some form of an inquisitorial legal system, found that none of these countries seemed to have frequent and ongoing campaigns concerning alleged miscarriages of justice. The survey arose out of a concern that this seemed to be a recurrent feature in Britain, even after the introduction of the CCRC. [17] Not only that, it seemed to be a feature too in other major countries which have an adversarial system. Australia has had high-profile and drawn out cases such as Chamberlain and Splatt. In Canada they have even formed an organization called the Association in Aid of the Wrongly Convicted. [18]

The advent of DNA typing has revealed many miscarriages of justice in the United States where a number of Innocence Projects have been formed to pursue this type of case. Between 1992 and March 2003, 124 people were exonerated in this way. [19] Exonerations have also been achieved by similar groups in Canada. Innocence Projects are run in Australia by Griffith University Law School in Queensland, Newcastle University Law School and the University of Technology in Sydney. [20]

The French inquisitorial system is seen by some to have particular advantages. [21] However, to radically change a fundamental and entrenched system such as that of the criminal law in Australia in that direction would be no easy task. No one state on its own could make the change and much discussion and debate would be necessary. It would not happen overnight. In the meantime, we need remedies that work sooner rather than later, and to that end it would be better to adapt rather than adopt. Some ideas for this are explored in the next chapter, but first the miscarriages which we believe already exist in South Australia must be properly and fully examined.

The problems in South Australia

In many of the cases we have looked at, the science did not and does not support the conclusions. In the pathology cases using Dr Manock’s evidence, Dr Manock did support the conclusions. In a number of instances, however, Dr Manock’s theories were not in accordance with the scientific literature, nor, as some say, would they be held by other people professionally engaged in these areas of scientific interest. [22] His calculations of the time of death in the Van Beelen and Szach cases, the cause of death in the Baby Deaths cases and his scenario of the death in the Keogh case are some examples. As the Preece case shows, one cannot have scientific theories that exist just on the basis of one person’s say-so.

In the Baby Deaths inquest, the Coroner accepted that Dr Manock had seen things which could not have been seen and that his answers to some of the questions were ‘spurious’. Without any independent witnesses and without any photographs in some of the cases, it may have been inappropriate to accept Dr Manock’s explanations of what he saw. Yet the Director of Public Prosecutions could still not see that there was something fundamentally wrong with Dr Manock’s continued involvement in the Keogh case. He said that the criticisms by the Coroner in the Baby Deaths inquest only related to Dr Manock’s shortcomings in respect of baby deaths, for which special skills are required. [23] Yet Dr Tony Thomas has stated that the errors that occurred there, such as the interpretation of X-rays, bruising or bronchopneumonia, were not matters which required any special paediatric skills.

Voice over Attorney-General: The Coroner did not find Dr Manock incompetent to conduct adult autopsies.

Graham Archer: Correct? Totally wrong. While the subjects were babies Manock failed to diagnose injury and infection common in both infants and adults. No specialised skills were required for that?

Dr Tony Thomas: Not in that particular context – of the interpretation of bronchopneumonia or even as I said fractured bones which one would expect a forensic pathologist to deal with in adults as well as in children. [24]

A Melbourne QC has stated that the Baby Deaths inquest was like the thirteenth chime of the crazy clock; – it should have brought into question ‘all prior utterances’. The DPP acknowledged in a television interview that he had confidence in Dr Manock in the Keogh case because Dr Manock had done some 9000 previous autopsies. [25] But as Rohan Wenn said in the interview (and the DPP accepted) that because you do a job often, doesn’t necessarily mean that you are doing it well. In this analogy, the 9000 autopsy reports might be the equivalent of ‘9000 prior utterances’. We take the view that the Baby Deaths cases alone should have justified a serious inquiry into Dr Manock’s other cases. However, we can now see that all of the cases which we have looked at in this book give rise to concerns that need to be addressed.

Serious inquiries are therefore warranted. To be effective, two inquiries are needed and they must be established promptly.

The first inquiry should be set up to investigate whether the verdict in the Keogh case is safe and satisfactory. Of all the other cases mentioned in this book, he is the only person who is still – perhaps inappropriately - currently serving a prison sentence.

The second inquiry, with the scope and powers of a Royal Commission, should examine the cases which we have discussed in this book. The inquiry must look not only at those particular cases we have raised, but also at the systemic problems which they represent and at the criminal justice system itself.

We can appreciate that the task of reviewing a considerable number of cases will be neither easy nor pleasant. It will reawaken interest in some of the most sordid aspects of our social history. It will bring great pain to the families and friends of those who have been caught up in those cases. The financial cost, as well as the social cost, will be considerable. It will take up money, time and expertise which could well be spent on current investigations and trials, or on other pressing social needs such as health and education. But this must not deter people. If the health of our criminal justice system is to be restored, it is imperative that it is known if there are yet more problems to be resolved.

Each inquiry’s investigations must be followed by corrective action. Just knowing is not enough– we have to be prepared to make the hard decisions.

Endnotes

1. G Samuels, ‘Is this the best we can do?’, Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, vol. 25, 1993, pp. 3–9.

2. Ibid.

3. Mick Hamer, ‘How a forensic scientist fell foul of the law’, New Scientist, 3 September 1981, pp. 575–6.

4. Cited in Hamer, ref. 3.

5. Cited in ‘Prisoner cleared of murder after serving 8 years’, The Times (London), 20 June 1981, p. 1.

6. Ibid.

7. AR Brownlie, ‘Expert evidence in the light of Preece v H. M. Advocate’, Medicine, Science and the Law, vol. 22, 1982, pp. 237–44.

8. ‘Cot death mothers: the witch hunt’, 4 Corners, television program, ABC TV, (program from the BBC), 5 August 2003.

9. Downloaded from http://www.gmc-uk.org/news/current/Meadows%20Statement.htm> on 12 February 2004.

10. See ‘Cot death mothers’, 4 Corners, ref. 8.

11. The information in this section has been compiled from the materials which are available through the Criminal Cases Review Commission website.

12. D Napley, ‘Trial at law’, Medicine, Science and the Law, vol. 8, 1968, pp. 227–42.

13. See, for example, the references to Havard (ref. 15), Kennedy (ref. 17) and Brownlie (ref. 21) which follow.

14. See for example, IF Sheppard, ‘The issue of the inquisitorial system of justice’, Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, vol. 31 1999, pp. 19–28.

15. JDJ Havard, ‘Expert scientific evidence under the adversarial system. A travesty of justice?’, Journal of the Forensic Science Society, vol. 32, 1992, pp. 225–35.

16. See Napley, ref. 12.

17. L Kennedy, Thirty-six murders and two immoral earnings, Profile Books, London, 2003.

18. Ibid.

19. The Innocence Project at Benjamin N Cardozo School of Law, founded by Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld.

20. T Simon, ‘It wasn’t me’, The Weekend Australian Magazine, 26–27 July, 2003, pp. 28–31.

21. AR Brownlie, ‘The presentation of scientific evidence in court: Great Britain’, Journal of the Forensic Science Society, vol. 14, 1974, pp. 183–90.

D Kinley & A Rose, ‘The quest for the truth: a comparative analysis of the role of experts in litigation’, Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, vol. 31, 1999, pp. 5–18.

See also Kennedy, ref. 17.

22. SM Cordner, ‘Further opinion in the case of Anna Cheney (deceased)’, to Sykes Bidstrup, Adelaide, 16 December 1996.

23. Interview by Rohan Wenn, Today Tonight, television program, Channel 7 (Adelaide), recorded 27 June 2002.

24. Today Tonight, television program, Channel 7, (Adelaide), 17 March 2003.

25. See interview by Rohan Wenn, Today Tonight, ref. 23.

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